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Abstract The Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium is algorithmically defined,
for any game in normal form with perfect information and no ties, as the
iterated deletion of non-individually-rational strategy profiles until at most
one remains. It is always Pareto optimal and thus provides a simple way out
of social dilemmas. In this paper, we characterize the Perfectly Transparent
Equilibrium with adapted Kripke models having necessary rationality, neces-
sary knowledge of strategies – necessary epistemic (factual) omniscience – as
well as eventual logical omniscience.
Eventual logical omniscience is introduced as a weaker version of perfect
logical omniscience, with logical omniscience being quantized and fading away
counterfactually. It is the price to pay for necessary factual omniscience and
necessary rationality: we conjecture that epistemic omniscience, logical omni-
science and necessary rationality form an impossibility triangle.
We consider multimodal classes of Kripke structures, with respect to agents,
but also in the sense that we have both epistemic and logical accessibility rela-
tions. Knowledge is defined in terms of the former, while necessity is defined in
terms of the latter. Lewisian closest-state functions, which are not restricted
to unilateral deviations, model counterfactuals.
We use impossible possible worlds a` la Rantala to model that some strategy
profiles cannot possibly be reached in some situations. Eventual logical om-
niscience is then bootstrapped with the agents’ considering that, at logically
possible, but non-normal worlds a` la Kripke, any world is logically accessi-
ble and thus any deviation of strategy is possible. As in known in literature,
under rationality and knowledge of strategies, these worlds characterize indi-
vidual rationality. Then, in normal worlds, higher levels of logical omniscience
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characterize higher levels of individual rationality, and a high-enough level
of logical omniscience characterizes, when it exists, the Perfectly Transparent
Equilibrium.
Keywords Counterfactual dependency, Perfect Prediction, Transparency,
Non-Cooperative Game Theory, Non-Nashian Game Theory, Symmetric
Games, Superrationality
1 Introduction: perfect prediction and epistemic omniscience
In classical game theory and, more generally, the neoclassical school of eco-
nomics, we typically build rationality on the top of an assumption that agents
can unilaterally change their strategies. With this mindset, Stalnaker (1994)
applied Kripke (1963)’s work to game theory and showed that rationalizability
is characterized with common belief in rationality, and that Nash equilibria
are characterized with rationality and knowledge of of the opponent’s beliefs
about one’s strategy.
Allowing only for unilateral deviations, however, leaves us with the insat-
isfaction of accounting for – predicting or describing – agent’s decisions, while
simultaneously assuming that they are unpredictable. This leads to tricky situ-
ations in which reasonings involve states in which some agents are not rational,
or for games in extensive form, situations in which reasoning is made at nodes
that are not actually reached if all agents are rational. This is widely discussed
in literature, for example by Aumann (1995), Binmore (1996), Binmore (1997),
Stalnaker (1998), Halpern (2001).
Dupuy (1992) showed that understanding the prediction structure in New-
comb’s problem was directly connected to the Prisoner’s dilemma. In (Dupuy,
2000), he suggested that an alternate account of rationality could be used to
suggest new solution concepts in which agents perfectly predict each other’s
strategies in all possible worlds, and are rational in all possible worlds. This
was formalized by Fourny et al (2018) as the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium
for games in extensive form, and later extended (Fourny, 2017) to games in
normal form as the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium (PTE).
Halpern and Pass (2013) characterized a new construct (individually ratio-
nal miminax-rationalizable outcomes) with Common Counterfactual Belief of
Rationality (CCBR), which is a weaker form of our assumption of rationality
in all possible worlds (necessary rationality). As it turns out, the PTE often
coincides with Halpern’s and Pass’s solution concept, but some counterex-
amples are known. Other papers in literature investigate alternate solution
concepts that are more transparent than Nash equilibria (Bilo` and Flammini,
2011) (Shiffrin et al, 2009) (Tennenholtz, 2004). Their relationship with the
PTE is discussed in (Fourny, 2017).
This paper aims at providing a characterization in Kripke semantics of the
PTE. As a consequence, this provides a clear understanding of where Perfect
Prediction and CCBR differ.
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We are going to make the outrageously unrealistic assumption that players
are epistemically omniscient12. There is in particular knowledge of strategies in
all possible worlds, known as necessary knowledge of rationality3. In addition,
we assume rationality in all possible worlds, known as necessary rationality4.
As all strategies are known by all agents in all possible worlds, the price
to pay for this epistemic omniscience is a weakening of logical omniscience.
We consider Kripke models arranged in layers of increasing degrees of logical
omniscience, in such a way that logical omniscience gradually degrades coun-
terfactually. Non-normal worlds (Kripke, 1965) in which anything is logically
possible are eventually reached after a finite number of nested counterfactual
deviations, which bootstraps what we call eventual logical omniscience and
supports formally the iterated deletion of non-individually-rational strategy
profiles underlying the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the
basic concepts of the PTE, including games in normal form. Section 3 intro-
duces our adapted Kripke framework to describe our assumption of necessary
rationality, necessary knowledge of strategies and eventual logical omniscience
in terms of possible worlds and accessibility relations. Section 4 introduces
classical Kripke semantics concepts such as knowledge and necessity, as well
as our conception of rationality under epistemic omniscience, and eventual
logical omniscience. Section 5 introduces the syntax for our modal logic con-
structs (rationality, knowledge of strategies, necessity, etc). Section 6 states
the equivalence between Kripke models with necessary rationality, necessary
knowledge of strategy and eventual logical omniscience and the PTE. Section
7 wraps up our findings and summarizes differences with CCBR.
2 Background: games in normal form and the Perfectly
Transparent Equilibrium
The Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium adapts Dupuy (2000)’s framework of
Perfect Prediction to games in normal forms: strategic games. We are inter-
ested in settings with perfect information in that players all know the details
of the game. We consider pure strategies in the sense that players do not as-
semble mixed strategies with weights, and we consider games with no random
moves (no dice rolls) and no ties5.
1 This is an intended hint to (Stalnaker, 1994), who makes this statement about logical
omniscience
2 In spite of seeming unrealistic, this assumption is very relevant, as Dupuy explains that
Perfect Prediction does not need to hold: it suffices that players believe that they are all
perfect predictors to reach the outcome characterized by Perfect Prediction. Indeed, the
commonly predicted outcome is dictated by the laws of logics, and the laws of logics alone,
as beautifully explained by Hofstadter (1983).
3 This is a stronger assumption than common knowledge of strategies
4 This is a stronger assumption than common knowledge of rationality
5 also called “in general position” in literature.
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In this section, we summarize the most important definitions around the
PTE. More details as well as numerous examples can be found in (Fourny,
2017).
2.1 Games in normal form
A game in normal form can be described with a matrix mapping each possible
combination of the players’ choices of strategy, called a strategy profile, to the
payoffs they receive.
Definition 1 (Game in normal form)
A game in normal form Γ = (P, (Σi)i, (ui)i) is defined with:
– a finite set of players P .
– a set of strategies Σi for each player i ∈ P . The set of strategy profiles is
denoted Σ = ×i∈PΣi.
– a specification of payoffs ui(
−→σ ) for each player i ∈ P and strategy profile
−→σ = (σj)j∈P .
We only consider pure strategies, meaning that players may not use ran-
domness to build mixed strategies. The outcome of a game must thus always
be one of the strategy profiles of the normal form matrix, with each player
getting the corresponding payoff.
Furthermore, in this paper, we assume that there are no ties, meaning that
a player always has a strict preference between any two strategy profiles.
Payoffs only have an ordinal meaning, which is why in all our examples we
use an increasing sequence of small integers starting with 0.
Finally, the game is only played once: it is important to understand that
this is not a repeated-game equilibrium.
2.2 Preemption
Algorithmically, the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium is obtained by iterated
elimination of non-individually-rational strategy profiles until at most one re-
mains. In particular, when it exists, it is unique.
2.2.1 The first round of elimination: individual rationality
We now recall the computation of the PTE, as it was introduced in (Fourny,
2017). The core idea is that it generalizes individual rationality to higher
levels that consider the fact that some strategy profiles were eliminated on
lower levels and cannot be possibly commonly known as the solution.
Level-1 individual rationality coincides with individual rationality as broadly
found in literature, e.g., in the folk theorem characterizing stable equilibria
in repeated games, and defines a subset of all strategy profiles that Pareto-
dominate the tuple of maximin payoffs.
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Level-2 individual rationality re-iterates this same idea, keeping strategy
profiles that Pareto-dominate the tuple of maximin payoffs but taking into
consideration only strategy profiles from level 1, and so on. Strategy profiles
get iteratively deleted as one considers higher levels of individual rationality.
At some point, either one profile remains and is stable, which is the PTE,
or all profiles get eliminated, and there is no equilibrium.
The following definition summarizes this process6.
Definition 2 (Level-k individually rational strategy profile) Given a
game in normal form Γ = (P,Σ, u) with no ties, a strategy profile is level-
k preempted, for k ≥ 1, if it does not Pareto-dominate the maximin utility,
where the maximin is only taking into account strategy profiles that are not
level-(k − 1)-preempted7. The recursion is initialized with S0(Γ ) = Σ, that
is, all profile are level-0 individually rational and none are level-0 preempted.
The strategy profiles −→σ ∈ Sk(Γ ) that survive the kth round of elimination are
called level-k individually rational, and are characterized with:
Sk(Γ ) = {
−→σ |∀i ∈ P, ui(
−→σ ) ≥
max
τi ∈ Σi
s.t.∃τ−i∈Σ−i,(τi,τ−i)∈Sk−1(Γ )
min
τ−i ∈ Σ−i
s.t.(τi,τ−i)∈Sk−1(Γ )
ui(τi, τ−i)}
2.3 Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium
The PTE is defined as the one strategy profile, if any, that survives the above
iterated elimination of strategy profiles, i.e., it is the only one that is level-k
individually rational for arbitrarily high k.
Definition 3 (Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium for games in nor-
mal form) Given a game in normal form with no ties, a Perfectly Transpar-
ent Equilibrium is a strategy profile that is level-k individually rational for all
k ∈ N. The set of Perfectly Transparent Equilibria is S(Γ ) = ∩kSk(Γ ).
The PTE is at most unique. Uniqueness of the Perfectly Transparent Equi-
librium is crucial to the justification of Perfect Prediction, as the players have
no magic powers. Rather, they predict the outcome of the game thanks to the
laws of logic and their awareness that all players are rational, reason perfectly
well, and because there is common knowledge thereof in all possible worlds.
Since the laws of logics dictate at most one answer, as explained by Hofstadter
(1983), the fact that they all arrive to the same conclusion is not due to tele-
pathic powers, but to their sole mastery of modal logic.
6 For brevity, we merged the definition for level-1 individual rationality with the general
definition originally given separately in Fourny (2017) for pedagogical purposes, as the former
is a special case of the latter if we properly initialize S0 to the set of all strategy profiles.
7 That is, that are level-(k − 1) individually rational.
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It is this modal logic that we are now going to give a formal account of,
characterizing the Kripke models underlying the Perfectly Transparent Equi-
llibrium.
3 Kripke framework
We now introduce our adapted Kripke models to characterize the PTE in
terms of modal logic.
3.1 The general idea
Stalnaker (1994) introduced the idea of using Kripke (1963)’s seeding work
to characterize and evaluate solution concepts. A solution concept can thus
be characterized algorithmically (i.e., for rationalizability, iterated deletion of
dominated strategies) as well as epistemically (i.e., common belief in rational-
ity).
The algorithmic characterization of the PTE was given by Fourny (2017)
and recalled in Section 2. In this paper, we give a characterization of the PTE
in terms of Kripke (1963) semantics.
In Stalnaker’s original work, and in most of the field of classical game the-
ory, only unilateral deviations or strategies are considered, making it a purely
epistemic approach as described for example by Perea (2012). However, Per-
fect Prediction introduces rationality in all possible worlds as well as common
knowledge of strategies in all possible worlds, a machinery that only makes
sense by dropping the assumption of unilateral deviations: counterfactuals, in
the way that they were introduced by Lewis (1973) are thus needed to express
the consequences of a deviation of strategies. For example, in the prisoner’s
dilemma, we can express statements justifying rational cooperation such as
“If I were to defect, the opponent would defect as well.” This is implemented
with closest state functions.
A related approach introducing counterfactuals after Lewis and dropping
the assumption of unilateral deviations was contributed by Halpern and Pass
(2013) for characterizing Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality (CCBR).
Necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies are stronger and
more radical assumptions than CCBR, although we will use similar closest-
state functions as in Halpern and Pass (2013). However, unlike Halpern and
Pass, we do not have any probability distributions modeling beliefs, as we are
working with epistemically omniscient agents (Perfect Predictors).
We use multimodal Kripke models, not only in terms of agents, but also in
terms of kind of accessibility relation. We explicitly distinguish between epis-
temic accessibility to model what worlds agents consider epistemically possible,
and logical accessibility to model worlds that agents consider logically possible
(possibly counterfactually), and include them both in our Kripke models.
We introduce impossible possible worlds, both in a way similar to Kripke
(1965), with non-normal worlds in which everything is possible and nothing
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is necessary, and also impossible possible worlds similar to (Rantala, 1982),
which are logically impossible worlds in which we set truth values manually.
In any possible world, we will have common knowledge of rationality, and
common knowledge of strategies8. As this is true in all possible worlds, it
follows that we have a much more stringent assumption than in Nashian game
theory, namely: necessary rationality9 and necessary knowledge of strategies.
The price to pay is that we cannot have full logical omniscience in all possi-
ble worlds. We thus introduce the notion of level-k logical omniscience, which
can be seen as reasoning steps in a “Turing machine” that computes the PTE.
The level of logical omniscience decreases as agents navigate conterfactuals,
until non-normal Kripkean worlds are reached at level 1. The PTE is char-
acterized with Kripke frames fulfilling the above assumptions on high enough
levels of logical omniscience.
From a terminology perspective, we will use the words “Kripke frame”,
which is, simply put, a skeleton graph of worlds, as well as “Kripke structure”
– a Kripke frame with a labelling function assigning truth values to logical
formulas – and “Kripke model” – a Kripke structure with an actual world.
Let us start by formally defining our Kripke frames.
Definition 4 (Kripke frame) A Kripke frameM appropriate for a strategic
game Γ = (P, (Σi)i∈P , (ui)i∈P ) is a tuple
M = (Ω,Λ,Ξ,−→σ ,K,L, f)
where:
– Ω is a set of possible worlds (including impossible possible worlds);
– Λ ⊆ Ω is the set of all logically possible worlds (which can be normal or
not);
– Ξ ⊆ Λ is the set of all normal worlds;
– −→σ ∈ Ω → Σ maps these worlds to strategy profiles in Σ = ×i∈PΣi;
– Ki ⊆ Ω2 is the epistemic accessibility relation for each player i ∈ P ;
– Li ⊆ Ω2 is the logical accessibility relation for each player i ∈ P ;
– f ∈ Ω × P × Σ → Ω is the Lewisian closest-state function used for coun-
terfactual statements;
The following subsections detail the components of this Kripke frame.
8 A strategy is not an event, so that the term “common knowledge of strategies” may
appear as a surprise. We will formally explain what we mean with “knowledge of strategies”
by extending the concept of knowledge to any “world variable.”
9 The closest equivalent to this found in literature is (Halpern and Pass, 2013), who in-
troduce Common Counterfactual Knowledge of Rationality. Our approach is more stringent,
as this also entails that an agent would believe to also have been counterfactually rational
(CB*RAT), which is something Halpern and Pass exclude.
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3.2 Set of all possible worlds
Ω is the set of all possible worlds. We will consider individual worlds w ∈ Ω.
These worlds may be logically possible or not, and if they are logically possible,
they may be normal or not.
In each possible world, the game is played in some specific way, leading to
a specific outcome.
3.3 Logically possible worlds
Λ ⊆ Ω is the set of all logically possible worlds. These worlds are consistent
under the laws of propositional logic (modus ponens, weak consistency, etc)
and propositions are assigned truths as per their semantics. These worlds may
still be normal or non-normal (see Section 3.4).
We handle logically impossible worlds with Rantala’s “impossible possi-
ble worlds” approach, meaning that, in these worlds, logical statements are
assigned truth values individually (Rantala, 1982). We follow the fourth ap-
proach described in Halpern and Pucella (2011) in Section 2.5 in order to deal
with logical omniscience.
As we will see in Section 3.6, in any world, the agents may have their own
subjective assessments on which worlds are logically possible. Λ provides the
objective basis for what worlds are really logically possible. All agents agree
that any world in Λ is logically possible, even though they may believe that
further worlds are logically possible as well. This is the case in non-normal
Kripkean worlds where everything is logically possible and nothing is logically
necessary.
Lack of logical omniscience will be modelled with the notion of level-k
logical omniscience. The higher the value of k, the more logically omniscient
the agents.
3.4 Normal worlds
Ξ ⊆ Λ is the set of all normal worlds. In these worlds, not only the laws of
propositional logic apply, but necessity and possibility are also defined in terms
of Kripke semantics based on the logical accessibility relation and objective
logical possibility.
We handle non-normal worlds with Kripke’s “impossible possible worlds”
approach (Kripke, 1965), in the sense that modal operators are defined with
nothing being necessary, and everything being possible, rather than according
to classical normal semantics.
Non-normal worlds may also be logically impossible, in which case all truth
assignments, not only for the modal operators, are set manually.
A normal world is always logically possible.
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3.5 Epistemic accessibility relation
We have an epistemic accessibility relation wKiw
′ that expresses that in world
w, agent i considers world w′ epistemically possible, in the sense that w′ is
compatible with their knowledge and the facts that they are aware of.
This epistemic accessibility relation entails the concept of knowledge: an
event true in all epistemically accessible worlds from w is known in w.
We assume, as is widespread in game-theoretical settings, that the epis-
temic accessibility relation is reflexive (and thus serial), transitive and sym-
metric (and thus euclidian), i.e., it organizes the Ω space into partitions. In
the framework of the PTE and Perfect Prediction, epistemic accessibility re-
lations play a lesser role. Indeed, we are considering a class of Kripke models
in which the agents are epistemically omniscient on the topics that interest
us: each event relevant to us (rationality, etc), is common knowledge in the
worlds in which it happens. As we will see, the assumptions we will make
(necessary rationality, necessary knowledge of strategies) are stronger than
common knowledge.
In practice, the Kripke frames we will construct will use plain and simple
equality as the epistemic accessibility relation, even though this does not have
to be the case in wider contexts.
3.6 Logical accessibility function
We have a logical accessibility relation wLiw′ that expresses that in world w,
agent i considers world w′ to be logically possible.
This alternate accessibility relation implements the approach contributed
by Halpern and Pucella (2011), in the sense that an agent has a test function
that stamps every world in Ω as being logically possible from their perspective,
or not. This test function, in the world w, is implemented as T (w′) = wLiw′.
We are considering logical accessibility relation that are total on Λ, meaning
that Li ∩ Λ2 = Λ2. This condition on logical accessibility, which commonly
holds in literature in the absence of non-normal worlds, is thus even stronger
than having partitions, as there is only one partition in Λ: Λ itself. Any logically
possible world is thus logically accessible from any other logically possible
world.
For non-normal worlds, that is, in Ω \ Ξ, everything is logically possi-
ble. Non-normal worlds are thus connected to all worlds in Ω by the logical
accessibility relation.
In normal worlds, all logically possible worlds (Λ), and only them, are
logically accessible. This is all independent of the agent considered, as they
reason perfectly.
Note that, for a world that is non-normal but logically possible, both of the
above conditions are mutually compatible, i.e., as a logically possible worlds,
it is connected to all logically possible worlds, and as a non-normal world, it
is connected as well to all logically impossible worlds.
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This approach allows us to deal with (eventual) logical omniscience; indeed,
we need to bootstrap the reasoning from a state in which nothing is known
about logically impossibility, to states in which the agent knows exactly which
worlds are logically possible.
Note that we may have wLiw
′ even if wKiw
′ does not hold. In other words,
an agent may believe that a world, even if it is incompatible with their knowl-
edge, is logically possible and would have been (counterfactually) logically
possible. This corresponds to the seeding work of Lewis (1973) that defines
the semantics on counterfactual implications.
3.7 Strategy profile in each world
As is done commonly in literature, also in absence of knowledge of strategies,
we associate each world w ∈ Ω with the strategy profile reached by the players
in this world −→σ (w), i.e., −→σ is a function from Ω to Σ. We denote σi(w) the
strategy picked by agent i in world w.
We also assign strategy profiles to logically impossible worlds and non-
normal worlds.
3.8 Counterfactuals
Following Lewis (1973), we model counterfactual implications with a function
f associating a world w ∈ Ω, a player i ∈ P and a strategy s′i ∈ Σi with the
closest possible world f(w, i, s′i) ∈ Ω in which player i picks strategy s
′
i.
This function f is referred to as the closest-state function.
Note that this world may be logically impossible, or it may be non-normal.
However, it always holds that σi(f(w, i, s
′
i)) = s
′
i.
We slightly modify Lewisian semantics in the sense that a logically im-
possible world may be closer than a logically possible world. Indeed, worlds
may show no logical contradictions for a given deviation of strategy in the
presence of an agent with a lesser level of logical omniscience, but an agent
with a higher level of logical omniscience may have sufficient reasoning skills
to conclude that that same deviation of strategy is logically impossible. In
such a case, the closest-state function must return an impossible world to the
latter deviating agent.
In other words, the spheres of accessibility underlying f are arranged
around a possible world in decreasing levels of logical omniscience starting
with the actual world at the center. Given an agent i and deviation of strat-
egy s′i, a world with the highest (but lower or equal to that of the actual
world) level of logical omniscience and in which agent i picks s′i is thus cho-
sen as f(w, i, s′i), whether it is logically accessible or not
10. At equal levels, a
logically possible worlds is closer than a logically impossible world.
10 When f(w, i, s′
i
) is not logically accessible, it means that s′
i
is preempted, and agent i
considers this deviation to be logically impossible at his level of logical omniscience.
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4 Concepts used in Kripke frames
In this section, we formally introduce a few concepts such as events, world
variables, knowledge, necessity, epistemic omniscience, eventual logical omni-
science and rationality. Most of these concepts are commonly found in lit-
erature. World variables help us formalize knowledge of strategies cleanly as
strategies are not events.
4.1 Events and world variables
We use the definition of an event (also called proposition) commonly found in
literature.
Definition 5 (Event) An event E is a set of possible worlds:
E ⊂ Ω
We also introduce the definition of a world variable, having the strategy
profile world variable in mind. This definition is similar to that of random
variables in probability theory.
Definition 6 (World variable) A world variable X is a function that maps
each world to a target set S:
X ⊂ Ω → S
An example of world variable is −→σ , which maps each world to a strategy
profile.
4.2 Knowledge
Knowledge11 of an event follows the common approach in Kripke semantics,
based on the epistemic accessibility relation:
Definition 7 (Knowledge of an event) Agent i ∈ P knows event E ⊂ Ω
in world w ∈ Ω if
∀w′ ∈ Ω,wKiw
′ =⇒ w′ ∈ E
We extend this definition of knowledge to knowledge of a world variable
like so:
11 Our approach is epistemic rather than doxastic, because we assume reflexivity of the
epistemic accessibility relation.
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Definition 8 (Knowledge of a world variable) A world variable X ∈
Ω → V is known to an agent i ∈ P in a world w ∈ Ω if, in all epistemically
accessible worlds from w, X(w) has the same value:
∀w′ ∈ Ω,wKiw
′ =⇒ X(w′) = X(w)
Note that knowledge of an event in a world can seen as the conjunction
of the knowledge of its indicator function with the event happening in that
world.
In the following sections, we will in particular use knowledge of rationality
(an event) and knowledge of strategies (a world variable).
We do not need to introduce common knowledge in our framework, as
our assumptions, formulated in terms of necessity, are stronger than common
knowledge or even common counterfactual belief.
4.3 Necessity
Necessity is to the logical accessibility relation what knowledge is to the epis-
temic accessibility relation.
Definition 9 (Necessity of an event) In a normal world w ∈ Ξ, necessity
of an event E holds for agent i if that event includes all logically accessible
worlds.
∀w′ ∈ Ω,wLiw
′ =⇒ w′ ∈ E
In a non-normal world w /∈ Ξ, no event is ever necessary.
Note that, because logical worlds are always logically accessible, necessity
of an event in any world entails that it is a superset of the Γ set of logically
possible worlds. Since, in the class of frames considered, epistemic accessibility
implies logical accessibility and the latter is total on Λ, then a necessary event
is en event that happens in all worlds in Λ, and is thus commonly known in
all worlds in Λ. This fact is independent on the agent considered.
Also, note that the necessity of an event is never itself necessary in the
presence of non-normal worlds (Λ \Ξ 6= ∅), which is the case in our models12.
In particular, we will use necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of
strategies13.
12 We thus do not have RAT nor K(−→σ )
13 We could also use a weaker definition of necessity that propagates via the Lewisian
closest-state function, similar to Halpern’s and Pass’s CCBR: an event E is necessary in a
world w for agent i if it contains all worlds logically accessible by i from w, and, recursively,
if would also have been necessary in case of a logically possible deviation of strategies. A
necessary event then does not cover the entire Λ space, but only the transitive closure of
the state graph induced by (Li)i and f . We believe that the results in this paper would
still hold. However, the simple definition used here, is a more faithful account of Dupuy’s
projected time and Perfect Prediction, as discussed offline.
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4.4 Epistemic omniscience
We assume epistemic omniscience for everything relevant to us. Epistemic
omniscience applies in particular if Ki is the equality relation for all agents.
Epistemic omniscience is meant, here, as factual omniscience, i.e., it sub-
sumes deductive omniscience14, weak logical omniscience15 and strong logical
omniscience16: any proposition that holds is known to the agent.
First, we assume that strategies are always known in all possible worlds
(this entails necessary knowledge of strategies in all normal worlds).
∀i ∈ P, ∀w,w′ ∈ Ω,wKiw
′ =⇒ −→σ (w) = −→σ (w′)
Next, we assume that the logical accessibility of any world (or the lack
thereof) is known in all possible worlds (which entails necessary knowledge of
logical accessibility in all normal worlds):
∀i ∈ P, ∀w,w′, w′′ ∈ Ω,wKiw
′ ∧ wLiw
′′ =⇒ w′Liw
′′
Thus, we will omit the universal quantifier on epistemically possible worlds
and use the actual world on the left-hand-side of Li. The condition above is
actually entailed by the construction of (Li)i.
Thirdly, we assume that the closest-state function, for any agent and de-
viation of strategy, sends all worlds in a given epistemic partition to worlds
in a unique (same or other) epistemic partition, i.e., the consequences of any
deviation of strategies are known.
∀i, j ∈ P, ∀s′j ∈ Σj , ∀w,w
′ ∈ Ω,wKiw
′ =⇒ f(w, j, s′j)Kif(w
′, j, s′j)
As a consequence, we can write −→σ (f(w, i, s′i)) to represent the profile that
would be reached if agent i deviates to s′i without worrying about universal
quantifiers on the epistemic partition.
Finally, the logical possibility of a deviation of strategies is known as well:
∀i, j, k ∈ P, ∀s′j ∈ Σj , ∀w,w
′ ∈ Ω,wKiw
′∧wLkf(w, j, s
′
j) =⇒ wLkf(w
′, j, s′j)
We thus do not have to use a universal quantifier on epistemically accessible
worlds to making the statement that a deviation is possible (wLif(w, i, s′i)).
This holds if partitions of (Ki)i do not cross the boundaries of Λ and Ξ.
All in all, the consequence of epistemic omniscience is that the epistemic
accessibility relation will appear rarely in our statements.
14 KA ∧K(A⇒ B) =⇒ K(B)
15 Truths of propositional logic are known
16 Truths of modal logic are known
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4.5 Eventual logical omniscience
We now introduce the tools characterizing levels of logical omniscience. Even-
tual logical omniscience, suggested here, provides a way to model the emer-
gence of logical omniscience as agents progress in their logical reasonings.
We are looking at a class of Kripke models in which possible worlds are
organized in layers representing various levels of logical omniscience. At the
bottommost level (0), all worlds are logically impossible (Rantala, 1982). At
level 1, a logically possible world is non-normal, meaning that nothing is log-
ically necessary, and everything is logically possible (Kripke, 1965). At any
upper level of logical omniscience, a logically possible world is normal, mean-
ing that agents know which worlds are logically possible, and recursively know
that a deviation of strategy would (counterfactually) lead to a world with one
less level of logical omniscience, i.e., logical omniscience degrades counterfac-
tually.
Note that, for any level, we may have logically impossible worlds in which
the proposition of level-k logical omniscience is set manually as being true.
The actual world of a model will then be taken at a sufficiently high level
of logical omniscience, and in particular, will be normal (level at least 2). How-
ever, we do not have full (counterfactual) logical omniscience in the sense that
arbitrary counterfactual deviations would stay in normal worlds. In particular,
rationality is necessary, although it is not necessary that rationality is neces-
sary. We call this slightly weaker account for logical omniscience “eventual
logical omniscience”17.
Non-normal worlds (Kripke, 1965) allow us to manage logical omniscience
by bootstrapping the logical reasoning that leads to the outcomes that are
actually reachable in logically possible worlds. In normal worlds, an agent’s
assessment of logically possible possible worlds matches the actually logically
possible possible worlds.
Definition 10 (Level-k logical omniscience) A logically possible world
satisfies level-1 logical omniscience if it is non-normal (Λ \ Ξ).
For k ≥ 2, a logically possible world w ∈ Λ satisfies level-k logical omni-
science if:
– it is normal (w ∈ Ξ), and
– any deviation of strategies by any agent leads to a world (logically impos-
sible18 or not) satisfying level-(k − 1) logical omniscience.
– there exists a world w′ satisfying level-(k−1) logical omniscience, in which
the same strategy profile is reached (−→σ (w) = −→σ (w′)) and that is logically
accessible from w for all agents (wLiw′).19
17 This is a direct hint to the notion of eventual consistency in the database world.
18 The truth assignment of the level is then set manually.
19 Since k ≥ 2 and w is normal, this comes down to assuming that there is a logically
possible world (in Λ as well) with one less degree of logical omniscience and in which the
same strategy profile is reached. This can be seen as a monotony property, i.e., if it is known
that a strategy profile is logically impossible at level k of logical omniscience, then it is also
known to be logically impossible at any higher level.
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For logically impossible worlds, the level of logical omniscience is assigned
manually (Rantala, 1982).
The last condition says that the logical possibility of a strategy profile
must propagate downward through logical omniscience levels, i.e., if a strategy
profile was proven logically impossible at some level of logical omniscience,
then it must also be impossible at higher levels of logical omniscience as well.
In other words, the set of possible strategy profiles compatible with necessary
rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies must decrease when logical
omniscience increases.
In particular, logical omniscience on or above level 2 in a logically possible
world entails its normality.
4.6 Rationality
Rationality is defined as utility maximization. In this paper, rationality is
assumed in the context of necessary knowledge of strategies.
Since we are assuming necessary knowledge of strategies, in the sense that
strategies are known in all possible worlds, this allows us to define rationality
in a very simple way. Indeed, logically accessibility is known, and the outcome
of the Lewis closest state function is known as well for any agent and deviation
of strategy.
Definition 11 (Rationality) A player is rational in a logically possible world
w ∈ Λ if no logically possible change of strategy would guarantee a higher
payoff to them.
∀s′i ∈ Σi, wLif(w, i, s
′
i) =⇒ ui(
−→σ (w)) ≥ ui(
−→s (f(w, i, s′i)))
Note that the above definition entails that a player is also rational if they
believe that any other choice of strategy by them is logically impossible20.
This is actually the case for high enough levels of logical omniscience, as at
most one logically possible profile remains.
The truth value of rationality in logically impossible worlds is assigned
manually (Rantala, 1982). In practice, it is always assigned to true, following
Rantala (1982)’s requirement that a proposition true in all logically possible
worlds must always be assigned to true in logically impossible worlds21. More
generally, any necessary proposition in normal worlds must be set to true in
all logically impossible worlds, and its necessity to false.
5 Modal logic
We now extend our Kripke frames to models by adding truth assignments to
propositions and sentences.
20 meaning that it counterfactually leads to a logically impossible world
21 2.3.iii on page 109.
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5.1 Syntax
We extend a Kripke frame M to a model with a labelling function |= that
assign truth values to logical sentences, defined recursively as follows, for any
world in Λ.
We define the following atomic formulas, for a world w ∈ Λ:
w |= true, always
w |= RAT if all agents are rational in w
w |= K(−→σ ) if all agents know one another’s strategies
w |= OMNk if there is level-k logical omniscience, for k ≥ 1
w |= play(−→s ) if the strategy profile picked in w is −→s
w |= playi(si) if the strategy picked by agent i in w is si
We now introduce the connectives originally defined by Kripke (1963).
We introduce the two following propositional logic connectives for any log-
ically possible world w ∈ Λ:
w |= A ∧B if w |= A and w |= B
w |= ¬A if (M,w) 6|= A
As well as the derived connectives:
w |= A ∨B if w |= ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B)
w |= (A⇒ B) if w |= ¬A ∨B
w |= (A ⇐⇒ B) if w |= (A⇒ B) ∧ (B ⇒ A)
For any normal world w ∈ Ξ, we also define the modal logic connectives:
w |= A if A is necessary in w
It is naturally extended to::
w |= ♦A if w |= ¬¬A
Finally, we introduce the following operator for convenience22:
w |= ♦cA if ∃i, j ∈ P, s′i 6= si(w), wLjf(w, i, s
′
i) ∧ f(w, i, s
′
i) |= A
22 Note that, because of the way we defined levels of logical omniscience, the logical accessi-
bility relation is the same for all agents in any normal world with level-k logical omniscience
for k ≥ 1: all worlds are accessible if k = 1, and otherwise all worlds in Λ.
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We can thus express in particular the logical possibility of a deviation of
strategy, which is the logical possibility operator constrained to the range of
the Lewis closest-state function)23:
w |= ♦cplayi(s
′
i) if wLjf(w, i, s
′
i) for some j
5.2 Logically impossible worlds
For logically impossible worlds, we assign each proposional logic statement to
its truth value manually (Rantala, 1982). For example, we may have for a non-
normal world w |= RAT independently of whether the definition of rational-
ity applies. These worlds can be inconsistent regarding classical propositional
logic, e.g., we may not have weak consistency. In this paper, the terminology
“logically possible” refers to propositional logic.
5.3 Non-normal worlds
Logically possible non-normal worlds follow the laws of propositional logics,
meaning that the truth values of propositions are set according to Section 5.1.
However, in all non-normal worlds (including logically impossible worlds),
modal logic connectives are set according to different rules, as introduced by
Kripke (1965) in his seeding paper on impossible possible worlds.
w |= A never holds for any event A
w |= ♦A always holds for any event A
w |= ♦cA always holds for any event A
In other worlds, in a non-normal world, nothing is necessary, and everything
is possible.
5.4 Full support by a Kripke structure
We now characterize the Kripke structures that truly cover all possible agents’
choices. This can be seen as a weak form of free will, i.e., the agents can pick
any strategy they want and that they believe is logically possible.
Requiring full support is crucial, because unlike in Nashian settings such
as rationalizability, or in Halpern’s and Pass’s minimax-rationalizability, the
order of elimination of strategy profiles matters. Kripke models that are miss-
ing, for one reason or another, otherwise possible deviations of strategies may
thus diverge to a different outcome.
23 ♦c actually implicitly involves a virtual accessibility relation that restricts the logical
accessibility relation to one level below of logical omniscience plus the actual world. It is
this same virtual accessibility relation that the semantics of our closest-state functions is
based on.
18 Ghislain Fourny
Definition 12 (Level-k full-support by a Kripke structure) A Kripke
structure M = (Ω,Λ,Ξ,−→σ ,K,L, |=), appropriate for a game Γ and satisfying
the assumptions stated previously, is said to have level-0 full support with
respect to a logical formula F if ∀w ∈ Ω,w |= F and ∀w ∈ Ξ,w |= F as well
as
∀−→s ∈ Σ, ∃w ∈ Λ,w |= play(−→s )
M has level-1 full support with respect to a logical formula F if it has level-
0 full support, and for any Kripke structure N satisfying level-0 full support
and logically possible24 world x ∈ ΛN ,
x |=N F ∧OMN
1 =⇒ ∃w ∈ Λ,w |= play(−→σN (x)) ∧ F ∧OMN
1
For k ≥ 2, M has level-k full support with respect to a logical formula F
if it has level-(k − 1) full support, and for any Kripke structure N satisfying
level-(k − 1) full support and world x ∈ ΛN ,
x |=N F ∧OMN
k =⇒ ∃w ∈ Λ,w |= play(−→σN (x)) ∧F ∧OMN
k
A Kripke structure satisfying the above condition for all k is said to have
full-support with respect to F.
We will in particular use the above class with (necessary) rationality and
(necessary) knowledge of strategies, i.e., F = RAT ∧K(−→σ ).
The condition then says that a full-support Kripke model cannot ”miss” a
strategy profile realized in a world at some level k of logical omniscience under
necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies, if that strategy
profile could be obtained in a logically possible world in another Kripke model
that has full-support at level k−1. It can be seen as some kind of completeness
feature25, obtained in increasing levels of logical omniscience.
6 Characterization of the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium in
Kripke semantics
We now state how the PTE and the iterated deletion of preempted strategy
profile relate to Kripke frames as defined in the previous sections.
24 and non-normal because of the required antecedent
25 Not in the sense that completeness has in logic, which is why we are using a different
terminology to avoid confusion.
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6.1 Theorems and characterization
First, we start with the levels of iterated elimination.
At level 1, we characterize individual rationality with logically possible,
non-normal worlds with rationality and knowledge of strategies. This result is
well known in literature.26
Theorem 1 Let Γ = (P,Σ, u) be a game in normal form.
Then the following is equivalent:
(a) −→s ∈ S1(Γ ), that is,
−→s is individually rational.
(b) There exists a Kripke structure M = (Ω,Λ,Ξ,−→s ,K,L, f, |=) that has full
support with respect to rationality and knowledge of strategies, and a logi-
cally possible, non-normal world w ∈ Λ \ Ξ such that
w |= play(−→s ) ∧RAT ∧K(−→σ ) ∧OMN1
In other words, the level-k individually rational outcomes are exactly the
outcomes o for which there exists a full-support Kripke model in which the
agents reach this outcome o under rationality, knowledge of strategies and level-
1 (non-normal) logical omniscience.
Next, we characterize each higher level of elimination of non-individually-
rational strategy profiles with higher levels of logical omniscience in normal
models.
Theorem 2 Let Γ = (P,Σ, u) be a game in normal form and k ≥ 2.
Then the following is equivalent:
(a) −→s ∈ Sk(Γ )
(b) There exists a Kripke structure M = (Ω,Λ,Ξ,−→s ,K,L, f, |=) that has full
support with respect to rationality and knowledge of strategies, and a logi-
cally possible world w ∈ Λ such that
w |= play(−→s ) ∧RAT ∧K(−→σ ) ∧OMNk
In other words, the level-k individually rational outcomes are exactly the
outcomes o for which there exists a full-support Kripke model in which the
agents reach this outcome o under necessary rationality, necessary knowledge
of strategies and level-k logical omniscience.
Finally, we can characterize Perfectly Transparent Equilibria in terms of
Kripke models by going to arbitrarily high levels of logical omniscience.
Theorem 3 Let Γ = (P,Σ, u) be a game in normal form.
Then the following is equivalent:
26 Meaning that individual rationality corresponds in Kripke semantics to rationality and
knowledge of strategies. The non-normal aspect, meaning that all deviations of strategies
are considered possible, is mentioned explicitly in this paper.
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(a) −→s is a PTE for Γ
(b) For any k ≥ 2, there exists a Kripke structureM = (Ω,Λ,Ξ,−→s ,K,L, f, |=)
that has full support with respect to rationality and knowledge of strategies,
and a logically possible world w ∈ Λ such that
w |= play(−→s ) ∧RAT ∧K(−→σ ) ∧OMNk
In other words, the PTE characterizes the outcomes o for which there exists
a full-support Kripke model in which the agents reach this outcome o under
necessary rationality, necessary knowledge of strategies and an arbitrarily high
level of logical omniscience
6.2 Canonical Kripke structure
In order to prove these lemmas, we are introducing some tools, in particu-
lar, the Canonical Kripke structure, which serves as a constructive proof of
existence of a counterfactual structure underlying the PTE.
Definition 13 (Canonical Kripke structure)
For a game Γ , we define the canonical Kripke structure27
M(Γ ) = (Ω,Λ,Ξ,−→σ ,K,L, |=)
recursively as follows.
Let Ω = Σ × N. Worlds are thus organized in levels.
Let Λ = {(−→s , k) ∈ Σ × N|k ≥ 1 ∧ −→s ∈ Sk(Γ )}. In particular, worlds on
level 0 are thus logically impossible worlds.
Let Ξ = {(−→s , k) ∈ Σ × N|k ≥ 2 ∧ −→s ∈ Sk(Γ )}. In particular, worlds on
level 1 (and 0) are thus non-normal worlds.
Let −→σ be defined as
∀w = (−→s , k) ∈ Ω,−→σ (w) = −→s
We also introduce the ”level” notation:
∀w = (−→s , k) ∈ Ω,Λ, λ(w) = k
Let (Ki)i be defined as the equality relation, i.e.:
∀i ∈ P, ∀w,w′ ∈ Ω,wKiw
′ ⇐⇒ w = w′
Let (Li)i be defined as:
∀i ∈ P, ∀w,w′ ∈ Ω,wLiw
′ ⇐⇒ w′ ∈ Λ ∨ w /∈ Ξ
27 The difference between a structure and a model is that, in a model, we specify an actual
world.
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Note that this is a total relation on Λ, and any world is logically accessible
from Ω \ Ξ.
Let f be defined as a ”worst case scenario” w.r.t. the opponent’s reaction,
that is (the first case that applies is taken):
∀w ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ P, ∀s′i ∈ Σi, f(w, i, s
′
i) =
(1)

((s′i, s−i), 0) if λ(w) = 0
w if σi(w) = s
′
i
((s′i, arg min
τ−i ∈ Σ−i
s.t.(s′
i
,τ−i)∈Sλ(w)−1(Γ )
ui(s
′
i, τ−i)), λ(w) − 1) if the min does not diverge
((s′i, s−i), λ(w) − 1) otherwise
(2)
For any logically impossible world w /∈ Λ, we set
w |= RAT
w |= K(−→σ )
w |= play(−→σ (w))
w |= OMNλ(w)
as well as the transitive closure thereof via ∧ and ¬.
For non-normal worlds, logically possible or impossible, we also set modal
operators in such a way that anything is possible and nothing is necessary.
6.3 Properties of canonical Kripke structures
The canonical Kripke structure has a few properties that we express as lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Cascading levels of counterfactuals in canonical Kripke
structures)
Let Γ be a game andM(Γ ) = (Ω,Λ,Ξ,−→σ ,K,L) its canonical Kripke struc-
ture.
We have, for any w ∈ Ω with λ(w) ≥ 1 and any s′i 6= σi(w):
λ(f(w, i, s′i)) = λ(w) − 1
and for w ∈ Λ with λ(w) ≥ 1 and any s′i 6= σi(w):
w |= ♦cplayi(s
′
i) ⇐⇒
−→s (f(w, i, s′i)) ∈ Sλ(w)−1
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Proof (Lemma 1) The first equality is obtained for any level k ≥ 1, because
f(w, i, s′i) is one level below w for any s
′
i 6= σi(w).
For the second statement, left to right, we have wLif(w, i, s′i) at level 1
because w is non-normal. The set membership is trivial for k = 1 as S0 = Σ.
For higher levels, we have f(w, i, s′i) ∈ Λ and the set membership holds by
definition of Λ.
For the second statement, right to left, the left-hand side holds trivially for
λ(w) = 1 by definition of non-normality. For higher levels, if −→s (f(w, i, s′i)) ∈
Sλ(w)−1, then the minimum in the definition of f does not diverge (s
′
i is in the
projection of Sλ(w)−1 onto agent i’s strategy space), and thus f(w, i, s
′
i) ∈ Λ,
wLif(w, i, s′i) and w |= ♦
cplayi(s
′
i).
Lemma 2 (Level-k logical omniscience in canonical Kripke struc-
tures)
Let Γ be a game andM(Γ ) = (Ω,Λ,Ξ,−→σ ,K,L) its canonical Kripke struc-
ture.
We have, for any w ∈ Ω such that λ(w) ≥ 1,
∀w ∈ Ω,w |= OMNλ(w)
Proof (Lemma 2)
First, for logically impossible worlds, this is true because we set the truth
assignment so.
Let us start with a logically possible, non-normal world w such that
λ(w) = 1
On level 1, this hold simply because w is non-normal, which characterizes
level-1 logical omniscience:
w |= OMN1
Now, let us assume that this is true for λ(w) = k ≥ 1 and prove that this
holds for λ(w) = k + 1.
Let us pick any logically possible (and normal) w such that
λ(w) = k + 1 ≥ 2
First, w is normal.
Second, for any (logically possible or not) deviation of strategy, we know
from Lemma 1 that:
λ(f(w, i, s′i)) = k
Using the induction hypothesis, we have:
f(w, i, s′i) |= OMN
k
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Finally, (−→σ (w), k) is a world satisfying level-k logical omniscience in which
the same strategy profile is reached. Because Sk+1 ⊂ Sk,
−→σ (w) ∈ Sk, (
−→σ (w), k) ∈
Λ, and it is thus logically accessible from w.
The above three points fulfill the definition of level-k logical omniscience
and thus:
w |= OMNk+1
This ends the recursion. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3 (Necessary rationality in canonical Kripke structures)
Let Γ be a game and M(Γ ) = (Ω,Λ,Ξ,−→σ ,K,L, |=) its canonical Kripke
structure.
We have, for any w ∈ Ω (and in particular w ∈ Λ):
w |= RAT
And thus, for any w ∈ Ξ:
w |= RAT
Proof (Lemma 3)
We have to prove rationality in any possible world.
For logically impossible worlds w /∈ Λ, rationality holds because the truth
assignment is set that way (w |= RAT ).
Let w ∈ Λ be a logically possible world (thus on a level at least 1). We
prove that all agents are rational in this world.
We have λ(w) = k ≥ 1.
Let i ∈ P be an agent. If no deviation is logically possible for agent i, then
we have already established that the agent is rational in w by definition of
rationality.
If there is one possible deviation for agent i, let us assume that s′i is a
logically possible deviation of strategy
w |= ♦cplayi(s
′
i)
and show that this deviation would give i a worse or equal payoff.
Since w ∈ Λ, we have −→s = −→σ (w) ∈ Sλ(w), and we have by definition of
(Sk)k∈N:
ui(
−→s ) ≥ max
τi ∈ Σi
s.t.∃τ−i∈Σ−i,(τi,τ−i)∈Sk−1
min
τ−i ∈ Σ−i
s.t.(τi,τ−i)∈Sk−1
ui(τi, τ−i) (3)
Since s′i is logically possible, f(w
′, i, s′i) ∈ Λ, and we have because of Lemma
1:
−→s (f(w′, i, s′i)) ∈ Sk−1
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And thus:
∃τ−i ∈ Σ−i, (s
′
i, τ−i) ∈ Sk−1(Γ )
Thus s′i belongs to the set over which the maximum is taken, and thus by
definition of the maximum:
w |= ♦cplayi(s
′
i) =⇒ ui(
−→s ) ≥ min
τ−i ∈ Σ−i
s.t.(s′
i
,τ−i)∈Sk−1(Γ )
ui(s
′
i, τ−i) (4)
And by definition of the argmin:
w |= ♦cplayi(s
′
i) =⇒ ui(
−→s ) ≥ ui(s
′
i, arg min
τ−i ∈ Σ−i
s.t.(s′
i
,τ−i)∈Sk−1(Γ )
ui(s
′
i, τ−i)) (5)
By definition of f for a logically possible deviation at level at least 1:
w |= ♦cplayi(s
′
i) =⇒ ui(
−→s ) ≥ ui(
−→σ (f(w′, i, s′i))) (6)
This holds for any i, s′i, thus rationality holds at w:
w |= RAT
Thus,
∀w ∈ Ω,w |= RAT
And thus, since all agents are rational in all logically possible worlds, by
definition of the necessity operator in a normal world, where exactly the logi-
cally possible worlds are logically accessible:
∀w ∈ Ξ,w |= RAT
This finishes the proof. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4 (Necessary knowledge of strategies in canonical Kripke
structures)
Let Γ be a game and M = (Ω,Λ,Ξ,−→σ ,K,L, |= its canonical Kripke struc-
ture.
We have, for any w ∈ Ω and in particular w ∈ Λ:
w |= K(−→σ )
And thus for any w ∈ Ξ:
w |= K(−→σ )
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Proof (Lemma 4)
This follows directly from the fact that the epistemic accessibility relation
is the equality relation, and from the definition of  in normal worlds.
Lemma 5 (Agent decisions in a canonical Kripke structure)
Let Γ be a game and M(Γ ) = (Ω,Λ,Ξ,−→σ ,K,L, |=) its canonical Kripke
structure.
We have, for any w ∈ Ω:
w |= play(−→σ (w))
Proof (Lemma 4)
This follows directly from the definition of −→σ for logically possible worlds.
For impossible worlds, the truth assignment is set that way.
Lemma 6 (Full-support by the canonical Kripke structure with re-
spect to rationality and knowledge of strategies)
Let Γ be a game and M(Γ ) = (Ω,Λ,Ξ,−→σ ,K,L, |=) its canonical Kripke
structure.
M has full support with respect to RAT ∧K(−→σ ).
Proof (Lemma 6)
We start with level 0.
We know that ∀w ∈ Ω,w |= RAT and ∀w ∈ Ξ,w |= RAT from Lemma
3.
We know that ∀w ∈ Ω,w |= K(−→σ ) and ∀w ∈ Ξ,w |= K(−→σ ) from Lemma
4.
Thus ∀w ∈ Ω,w |= RAT ∧K(−→σ ) and ∀w ∈ Ξ,w |= (RAT ∧K(−→σ )).
Furthermore, we have by construction, for each strategy profile, a world in
which that strategy profile is played.
The conditions of level-0 full-support are thus fulfilled.
We know prove the result for k = 1.
Let N be a Kripke structure with level-1 full support. Let us assume there
is a logically possible, non-normal world x ∈ ΛN such that
x |=N RAT ∧K(
−→σ N ) ∧OMN
1
We need to find an w ∈ Λ such that
w |= play(−→σN (x)) ∧RAT ∧K(
−→σ ) ∧OMN1
We first prove that −→σN (x) ∈ S1, i.e.,
−→σ N (x) is individually rational. This
result is known and commonly found in classical game theory literature.
Because of rationality in x, we have, for any deviation28 of strategies s′i:
ui(
−→σ N (x)) ≥ ui(
−→σN (fN(x, i, s
′
i)))
28 x is non-normal, so all deviations are logically possible in x
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We also have by definition of the minimum:
ui(
−→σN (fN (x, i, s
′
i))) ≥ min
τ−i ∈ Σ−i
ui(s
′
i, τ−i)
Thus, for any deviation of strategies s′i by agent i in world x:
ui(
−→σ N (x)) ≥ min
τ−i ∈ Σ−i
ui(s
′
i, τ−i)
The above also applies without deviation of strategy also by definition of
the min:
ui(
−→σ N (x)) ≥ min
τ−i ∈ Σ−i
ui(σN,i(x), τ−i)
And thus, taking the max:
∀i ∈ P, ui(
−→σ N (x)) ≥ max
τi ∈ Σi
min
τ−i ∈ Σ−i
ui(τi, τ−i)
And thus
−→σ N (x) ∈ S1
We can then take w = (−→σN (x), 1). Then by using Lemmas 3, 4, 5 and 2:
∃w ∈ Λ,w |= play(−→σN (x)) ∧RAT ∧K(
−→σ ) ∧OMN1
which proves level-1 full support.
We now prove the result recursively for k + 1 ≥ 2. We assume that the
lemma is true for k (thus k ≥ 1), i.e., for any Kripke structure N with level
with level-(k − 1) full support, we have
x |=N RAT∧K(
−→σ )∧OMNk =⇒ ∃w ∈ Λ,w |= play(−→σN (x))∧RAT∧K(
−→σ )∧OMNk
except in the special case that k = 1:
x |=N RAT∧K(
−→σ )∧OMN1 =⇒ ∃w ∈ Λ,w |= play(−→σN (x))∧RAT∧K(
−→σ )∧OMN1
Let N be a Kripke structure with level-k full support. Let us assume there
is a logically possible world x ∈ ΛN such that
x |=N RAT ∧K(
−→σ ) ∧OMNk+1
We need to find an w ∈ Λ such that
w |= play(−→σN (x)) ∧RAT ∧K(
−→σ ) ∧OMNk+1
We first prove that −→σN (x) ∈ Sk+1.
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Because of rationality in x, we have, for any logically possible deviation of
strategies s′i:
ui(
−→σ N (x)) ≥ ui(
−→σN (fN (x, i, s
′
i))
By definition of level-(k + 1) logical omniscience:
fN (x, i, s
′
i) |= OMN
k
If k ≥ 2, fN (x, i, s
′
i) is normal and thus logically necessity applies here in
the same way as in x:
fN (x, i, s
′
i) |= RAT ∧K(
−→σ ) ∧OMNk
If k = 1, it is non-normal and:
fN (x, i, s
′
i) |= RAT ∧K(
−→σ ) ∧OMN1
Since we know that M has level-k full support, we know that, in the case
that k ≥ 2:
∃w ∈ Λ,w |= play(−→σN (fN (x, i, s
′
i))) ∧RAT ∧K(
−→σ ) ∧OMNk
or if k = 1:
∃w ∈ Λ,w |= play(−→σN (fN (x, i, s
′
i))) ∧RAT ∧K(
−→σ ) ∧OMN1
By definition of M , because these worlds are logically possible, we know
that thus −→σN (f(x, i, s′i)) ∈ Sk for each possible deviation s
′
i.
Thus by definition of the min and by transitivity:
ui(
−→σ N (x)) ≥ min
τ−i ∈ Σ−i
s.t.(s′
i
,τ−i)∈Sk
ui(s
′
i, τ−i)
a
Furthermore, because N has full level-k support, and M has logically pos-
sible worlds with level-k logical omniscience for each strategy profile in Sk, we
know that the possible deviations of strategies for agent i in world x are thus
characterized by the projection of Sk on i’s strategy space, with the exception
of si = σN,i(x) (no change of strategy does not constitute a deviation). We are
thus missing one more inequality to get the complete set of logically possible
strategies for agent i, namely, that the actual payoff of agent i also dominates
the minimum payoff remaining in Sk for his actual strategy:
ui(
−→σ N (x)) ≥ min
τ−i ∈ Σ−i
s.t.(si,τ−i)∈Sk
ui(si, τ−i)
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However, by definition of level-k+1 logical omniscience, we do know that
there is a logically possible world in N with level-k logical omniscience, in
which −→σ N (x) is played. It follows from M having level-k full support that
−→σ N (x) ∈ Sk. Thus, the equality above holds as well.
Thus, it follows that the following holds for any s′i, and not only deviations,
in the projection of Sk−1 on agent i’s strategy space.
ui(
−→σ N (x)) ≥ min
τ−i ∈ Σ−i
s.t.(s′
i
,τ−i)∈Sk(Γ )
ui(s
′
i, τ−i)
Thus, taking the max:
∀i ∈ P, ui(
−→σ N (x)) ≥ max
τi ∈ Σi
s.t.∃τ−i∈Σ−i,(τi,τ−i)∈Sk(Γ )
min
τ−i ∈ Σ−i
s.t.(τi,τ−i)∈Sk(Γ )
ui(τi, τ−i)
And thus
−→σ N (x) ∈ Sk+1
We can then take w = (−→σN (x), k + 1). Then by using Lemmas 3, 4, 5 and
2:
∃w ∈ Λ,w |= play(−→σN (x)) ∧RAT ∧K(
−→σ ) ∧OMNk+1
Which finishes the proof. ⊓⊔
6.4 Proof of the main theorems
With the above lemmas, we are in a position to prove our main result.
Proof (Theorem 1)
We first prove that (a) implies (b) where, in (b), the canonical Kripke
structure is meant as M .
Let −→s ∈ S1(Γ ) by a level-k individually rational outcome.
Let w = (−→s , 1) ∈ Ω. This is a logically possible, non-normal world by
definition of Λ.
Firstly, Lemma 5 gives us:
w |= play(−→s ) (7)
Secondly, Lemma 2 gives us:
∀w ∈ Ω,w |= OMN1
Thirdly, Lemma 3 gives us:
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w |= RAT
Fourthly, Lemma 4 gives us:
w |= K(−→σ )
Because w is logically possible, we thus can establish that w fulfils the
required condition:
(M,w) |= play(−→s ) ∧RAT ∧K(−→σ ) ∧OMN1
We now prove that (b) implies (a).
Let N be a complete Kripke model with full support and x ∈ ΛN such that
x |=N play(
−→s ) ∧RAT ∧K(−→σ ) ∧OMN1
We know that the canonical Kripke structure has full support. Thus, by
definition of level-1 full support there must exist a world w fulfilling
w |= play(−→s ) ∧RAT ∧K(−→σ ) ∧OMN1
By definition of Λ and because of Lemma 1:
−→σ (w) = −→s ∈ Sλ(w) = S1
Which finishes the proof. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 2)
We first prove that (a) implies (b) where, in (b), the canonical Kripke
structure is meant as M .
Let −→s ∈ Sk(Γ ) by a level-k individually rational outcome for some k ≥ 1.
Let w = (−→s , k) ∈ Ω. This is a logically possible world by definition of Λ.
Firstly, Lemma 5 gives us:
w |= play(−→s ) (8)
Secondly, Lemma 2 gives us:
∀w ∈ Ω,w |= OMNk
Thirdly, Lemma 3 gives us:
w |= RAT
Fourthly, Lemma 4 gives us:
w |= K(−→σ )
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Because w is logically possible, we thus can establish that w fulfils the
required condition:
(M,w) |= play(−→s ) ∧RAT ∧K(−→σ ) ∧OMNk
We now prove that (b) implies (a).
Let N be a complete Kripke model with full support and x ∈ ΛN such that
x |=N play(
−→s ) ∧RAT ∧K(−→σ ) ∧OMNk
We know that the canonical Kripke structure has full support. Thus, by
definition of level-k full support there must exist a world w fulfilling
w |= play(−→s ) ∧RAT ∧K(−→σ ) ∧OMNk
By definition of Λ and because of Lemma 1:
−→σ (w) = −→s ∈ Sλ(w) = Sk
Which finishes the proof. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 3)
If −→s is a PTE, then it belongs to Sk for any k ≥ 1. It follows from Theo-
rem 2 that there is a Kripke model (structure and actual world) fulfilling the
conditions for any value of k.
Conversely, if we can find a Kripke model fulfilling these conditions for
any value of k ≥ 1, then ∀k ≥ 1,−→s ∈ Sk and thus
−→s ∈ ∩k≥1Sk, which
characterizes a PTE.
7 Conclusion and summary
In this paper, we characterized Perfectly Transparent Equilibria for strategic
games with no ties in terms of adapted Kripke semantics.
From an algorithmic perspective, a PTE is obtained by iterated deletion
of non-individually rational strategy profiles.
From a Kripke semantics perspective, a PTE is characterized by neces-
sary rationality, epistemic omniscience (in particular necessary knowledge of
strategies) and eventual logical omniscience.
The need to weaken the assumption of full logical omniscience suggest that
an impossible triangle may exist.
Conjecture 1 (Impossibility triangle)
There cannot be “useful” Kripke models having simultaneously:
1. Epistemic (factual) omniscience
2. Full logical omniscience
3. Necessary rationality
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We also gained insight at how the PTE differs from Halpern and Pass
(2013)’s Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality, in particular:
– CCBR deals with situations that are on a spectrum between a fully opaque
setting (unilateral deviations) and a fully transparent setting (epistemic
omniscience), but excluding fully transparent settings. Halpern and Pass
coined the term “translucency”. The PTE accounts for the end of the
spectrum where decisions are fully transparent (necessary knowledge of
strategies). The existence of counterexamples showing that CCBR and the
PTE may diverge demonstrates the existence of a singularity at that end
of the spectrum.
– CCBR involves probability distribution modeling beliefs at accessible worlds.
The PTE uses no probabilities, as it has full epistemic omniscience and
has a deterministic, albeit non-trivial, nature. The singularity is due to the
elimination of some worlds proven as logically impossible.
– CCBR recursively assumes that the other agents are (counterfactually)
rational in case of a deviation. The PTE relies on what Halpern and Pass
name CB*RAT, which is stronger and more transparent.
Since the Hofstadter equilibrium reached by superrational agents on sym-
metric games is a special case of PTE, it follows that we have also contributed
a formal Kripke semantics account for Douglas Hofstadter (1983)’s work.
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